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Malcolm Cowley: What Writers Are

New Republic

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The Mysterious Herr Gehlen

The Story of the General Who Runs West Germany's Vast New Secret Service

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

Unanimous condemnation by the Watkins Committee will hang over McCarthy for the rest of his life. It will be part of every appraisal from now on. The report's phrases will be weighed and debated, but there they are; they will make it hard for him to run his committee next year, supposing Republicans still control. Knowing what was in the report, GOP Leader William Knowland postponed calling a special session to consider censure till the campaign ended. He evidently felt it was too hot an issue for candidates to be asked to take a stand on during an election. Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson weakly seconded the postponement called for by Knowland who had primary responsibility. Republicans feel the decision to delay may perhaps hurt them, but not so much as a vote. Senators are still afraid of McCarthy. On the Republican side there is specifically a strong Protect-Saltonstall movement. That mild, agreeable, timorous Bay State Blue Blood may now get through the election without once uttering the terrifying word.

Back in July, 1939, five scientists sent an historic, secret letter to FDR, out of which grew the Manhattan Project. Every one of the five was foreign-born. There was Einstein (German), Szilard, Teller and Wigner (Hungarians) and Fermi (Italian). In those days America welcomed foreigners and was not afraid of scientists whose banishment was the greatest single piece of folly of the police states. Could men like these enter America today, under the McCarran Act? It is doubtful. Would they feel the same urge to come after the Oppenheimer case? One can only guess. Here is the latest chapter: Princeton and Columbia invited Paul Dirac, Cambridge University professor and Nobel prize winner, to lecture this fall. But the State Department said "No visa." (Dirac attended a Soviet scientific meeting after the war.) It is announced the ban has now been lifted, but Dirac has made other plans. Also barred is Marcus Oliphant, head of Australia's Academy of Science and director of the physical research school at the national university. He can get nothing better than a transit visa. Oliphant headed the British scientific team here in the war. No specific reason is given for either "Nyet" by McLeod's State Department. "Why is Oliphant inadmissible?" asked Warren Una, staff reporter of the *Washington Post and Times Herald*. A State Department official commented: "He's a do-gooder, one of the boys who monkey around with pinkos . . . Oppenheimer case . . . that sort of thing."

Scientists are intellectuals, and that is probably another reason for the current distrust of them. Eisenhower jibed at "intellectuals" last week and got a big laugh. The anti-intellectual know-nothing movement in his Administration has gone far: first disruption of the State Department, then attacks on teachers, librarians and preachers; now there are reins on the scientists . . . particularly foreigners.

This column doesn't often give tips on the stock market, but we would say that this is a good time to keep out of it. The stock market keeps bounding up; the national economy keeps standing still. It is the political thesis of the one-party press, of course, that things are booming and objective; candid appraisals are consequently hard to find. The fact is the expected Fall upturn is only very mild. One high Administration economic adviser told a group of correspondents last February that he would be seriously concerned if the tell-tale index of "estimated annual capital expenditures" collected quarterly by the Commerce Department did not steadily rise. The new tax bill was tailored to stimulate such a rise rather than to aid consumers. But the index has gone down for every quarter of 1954. Administration indecision is shown in the policy of not balancing the budget. Personally we guess the deficit next January is going to be substantially larger than now estimated, and we doubt if Ike balances the budget once in his four-year term. The rigid acreage control scheme to cut farm surpluses was dropped quickly after the Maine election. We would expect 4,500,000 unemployed by mid-winter in which case the Administration's so-called, preliminary "nudge" to the economy will certainly be turned into an outright push by an alarmed Congress. In his Hollywood Bowl speech last week Ike listed on his legislative agenda for next January "a tremendous new highway program." Hark, folks, is that the sound of the priming of distant pumps?

You could see why Ike feels TVA is "creeping socialism" after his ardent McNary Dam power speech last week. It was a speech from the heart—earnest, deeply sincere, and persuasive enough so that Democrats had better beware. Ike is a well-intentioned man with fine delivery, whose feather-cushion vagueness of phrase makes rebuttal difficult. He raised a picture of monopoly federalism and then attributed it to those who criticized his "middle road" policy. "It is not properly a federal responsbility," he said, "to try to supply all the power needs of our people." Well, who says it is? But behind the unassailable position of such bed-pillow language the power lobby can rejoice in having the best front in years. Ike has now definitely made himself the issue in the campaign. He has announced irrevocably that the election is a referendum on him and his policies. Many would think this a rash act, but at the same time it would be folly to underestimate the widespread goodwill that Ike's attractive personality generates. And after all, the Eisenhower "give-away" program is only large by modern standards. For perspective we must contrast it with other big business administrations.

Notes: Whoever wins the New York gubernatorial fight, Ives or Harriman, is *ipso facto* a strong Presidential possibility. . . . Nixon last April 16 told editors off-the-record he favored sending US troops to Indo-China if the French quit; now he is publicly praising the Administration for avoiding the "blunder" of war.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Now the Senate

MOST IMPORTANT, the proceedings and the report of the Select Committee which investigated censure charges against McCarthy do honor to the Senate. It remains to be seen how the Senate as a whole will conduct itself.

The Committee under Sen. Arthur V. Watkins (R, Utah) recommended censure of McCarthy on two charges—(1) that his conduct "toward the Senate was contemptuous, contumacious, and denunciatory . . . and was obstructive to legislative processes"; and (2) that his conduct toward General Zwicker was "reprehensible." It also criticized his conduct—"improper"; "highly irresponsible"—pertaining to three other charges.

The restraint manifested throughout the report, the quality of the reasoning and of the evidence supporting the censure recommendations as well as the care taken to consider only the most substantial charges (reasons for rejecting 33 others are given in detail), make this document one the Senate will have to deal with seriously. There is very little room for hedging. And in the face of this quietly damning indictment there seems no way for the Senate to avoid at least barring McCarthy from chairmanship of its committees.

Ironically enough, the successful effort of pro-McCarthy Senators to put off a showdown until after the November 4 elections may work to McCarthy's disadvantage. No McCarthy filibuster will frighten Senators anxious to get back to the hustings, and some of the faint-hearted will return emboldened by the thought of six long years of security. Political considerations, in short, will be at a minimum and the non-political tenor of the Watkins report will be its strength.

GM in the Pentagon

WHEN the Pentagon moved to concentrate our entire production of M-48 tanks in one firm—General Motors—the *NR* asked some questions (Dec. 21, 1953) about the kind of arms-procurement program we were getting from Defense Secretary (and former General Motors president) Charles E. Wilson. Now Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D, Wash.) has supplied some answers from Pentagon statistics.

During the first 18 months of the Republican Administration, new defense contracts (*i.e.*, minus cancellations) to General Motors increased by $1.7 billion net while new contracts to all other automobile firms declined by $395 million net.

In contrast, from the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, to January, 1953, when the Republicans took power, General Motors received $5.3 billion in net new contracts, and all its competitors together, $6 billion. So under the new administration, GM has progressed from receiving nearly half of all defense contracts awarded auto manufacturers to a position of overwhelming predominance. And where the old proportion might be to some degree justified by the size and capacity of GM, it is hard to see how the new can be justified on any grounds, military or economic.

It has been an axiom of modern warfare that production of all important weapons or goods must be dispersed to minimize the possibility of a "knock-out" air raid and to provide a base for rapid mobilization. And it would seem that the atomic and hydrogen bombs strengthen this theory. Perhaps not, but if not, no one has told the American public why not. Wilson seems to have scrapped the theory without ever announcing his intention to do so, explaining, or offering a substitute. If he has sound reasons surely they can be tested in public debate.

Economically, this channeling of government money to one firm is equally unjustified by what we know. There are only six automobile manufacturers left in this country. Threat of bankruptcy already has forced three mergers and the resulting four "independents" are just barely hanging on. Half of all Packard, Hudson and Studebaker workers have been laid off. Studebaker's remaining workers have taken a 14-percent wage cut and are working only every other week. Hudson workers are on a one- or two-day week.

Yet for General Motors the past two years have been years of record high profits. Comparing the first half of this year to the same period of 1953 shows that where the earnings of Chrysler Corporation fell by 64 percent, those of GM rose 36 percent. In the face of what is being done with defense contracts, it is impossible to explain all of this as the functioning of free enterprise.

On September 22, another contract was awarded: M-42 self-propelled guns: $35 million worth: General Motors.

To Readers Who Are Not Subscribers

The October 11 issue of *New Republic* will carry a special 24-page supplement: "Two Years of Eisenhower—A Voter's Guide to 1954." This supplement will appraise the record of the present Administration to date, and will contain the voting records of all Congressmen on the major issues before the 83rd Congress.

This supplement will be distributed only to subscribers, and will not be available on newsstands.

By subscribing to *New Republic*, you will be sure of receiving the special October 11 supplement—a valuable guide to the '54 elections. Your subscription order should be received not later than October 20. See page 4 for subscription rates.

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The President's Sincere Vagueness

ON SEPTEMBER 24, President Eisenhower stood on the Oregon banks of the mighty Columbia to dedicate the McNary federal multi-purpose dam—the accomplishment of previous Administrations. He chose the occasion to express in general terms certain ideas about government and political power which, obviously, impress him deeply: "a conversion of local regions into federal satellites poses a threat deadly to our liberties . . . monopoly is always potentially dangerous to freedom—even when monopoly is exercised by government . . . "; and, from Lincoln, "in all that the people can individually do for themselves, government ought not to interfere."

He then went on to castigate "those zealots" who object to his "local-federal partnership" plan for the development of our natural resources: "Only [through a government monopoly over power], these zealots would have us believe, can we poor citizens be protected against exploitation by what they call the 'predatory' exponents of capitalism—that is free enterprise."

There really are very few people in this country who would reject these general ideas about dangers of giant government—to have lived in the Communist-Nazi menaced 20th Century is to dread the super state. But nothing is more simple—or less useful—than to denounce "big business" or "big government" as the one great threat to our liberties. For disagreement comes when a definition of "threat" and "big" is attempted, when a concept of "government's role" and "free enterprise" is applied to a specific situation.

For many weeks now, Eisenhower has been involved in a private vs. public power controversy which began when, with an arbitrary assumption of political power, he overrode the objections of two independent government agencies, TVA and the Atomic Energy Commission, and ordered them to sign a contract with the Dixon-Yates public utility combine (*NR*, July 19, Sept. 13, Sept. 27). That contract also is opposed by a majority of the local officials in the Tennessee Valley region. It was awarded without competitive bidding. A New York group, headed by Walter Von Tresckow, which tried to bid, has charged that its figures were falsified by the Bureau of the Budget. The Republican Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, W. Sterling Cole of New York, has persistently postponed hearings on the contract, and Republican Sen. William Langer has been prevented from investigating it with his Monopoly Subcommittee because the Republican leaders of the Senate refused him funds.

Two days before Eisenhower made his Oregon speech, J. D. Stietenroth, since 1937 the "principal financial and accounting officer" of the Mississippi Power and Light Company (part of the Dixon-Yates combine), charged that the company kept two sets of books, one in Mississippi and another for tax purposes, in the offices of Ebasco Services, New York, that "not a single principle officer or director . . . is permitted to exercise the full powers . . . of his office," that "the utility business in the states of Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi (the Middle South System) represents a colonial empire" for "people sometimes referred to as 'Wall Street' " and that the company is forced to overcharge its customers by several million dollars per year. Stietenroth asked his fellow officers to join him in protesting the situation. Two hours later he was fired.

One day before Eisenhower's Oregon speech, the Governor of Tennessee, Frank Clement, wrote asking the President to "suspend further negotiations" on the Dixon-Yates contract until these "serious accusations" could be investigated. The Governor revealed that A. E. McLean, preferred stock registrar for Arkansas Power and Light Co. (also part of Dixon-Yates), had charged his company with reaping an illegal 13.5-percent profit from a recently granted rate increase. (In 1942, when the Federal Power Commission tried to examine the records of both the Mississippi and the Arkansas company, it was informed by Ebasco, which controlled both, that "they had lost their books.")

The next day Eisenhower made his speech about "government monopoly," "zealots," and "free-enterprise." No action has been taken on Governor Clement's request. Cole has again promised hearings, but again has not fixed a date.

Eisenhower obviously does not want TVA to get any bigger without good reason. Certainly it is time to find out if it should. But there are those around him who would exploit that attitude to break up TVA and take control of the market it has created. And worry as he will about the evils of "big government," President Eisenhower will find that he has only strengthened the "zealots" and pushed hard on the pendulum which threatens to swing perpetually from extreme regulation to extreme *laissez-faire*, unless he can see clearly when enterprise is free and when it is not, when he is being told the truth and when he is not.

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Quemoy: The Tightening Web

"EXISTENCE here is a living death," a senior official in Chiang Kai-shek's government recently told Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, military analyst for the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*. Reporting from Formosa, Phillips writes: "The intensity of this feeling is matched by the intensity of their desire to get back to the mainland; war is the only way back, and only the US can help them back in a war." Those simple facts do much to clarify the "Quemoy Incident" (*NR*, Sept. 20) and our government's reaction.

Behind the contradictory Nationalist Chinese reports about the nature of the Communist action against the Island of Quemoy and the deliberately vague US pronouncements about the extent of US commitments, there lie the hard, and dangerous, realities of a marriage of convenience: we are using the Chinese Nationalists, and they are using us. But they would like to use us still further in ways which a majority of Americans so far will not accept.

So Chiang must work to change our minds. We cannot hope to change his—he has no place to go but East.

In the present US Pacific defense plan, Formosa has a new strategic value. The speed of jet aircraft and the build-up of Russian and Red Chinese air forces in the Far East has forced the US Fifth Air Force to re-deploy its precious medium and heavy bombers; even Okinawa, specifically designed as a strategic bomber base, is no longer suitable as such because it is within surprise-raid distance of the mainland. Okinawa now is to be a link in a continuous chain of fighter-and-radar bases stretching from the Japanese Islands through the Ryukyus to Formosa and the Philippines—a chain which can give early warning to the strategic bases behind it. Loss of Formosa —230 miles north of the Philippines and about the same distance south of Okinawa—would leave a big hole.

So Formosa and the Nationalists who man it are of use to the US, and we have committed ourselves to defend it. And the US Seventh Fleet is Chiang's best protection: as long as it is there, the massive Red Armies which otherwise would overwhelm him cannot even reach him. Left at that, this would seem a reasonably convenient and satisfactory Cold War arrangement.

But one of the first Republican gestures was to "unleash" Chiang; he now can raid and goad the Communists to the limit of his resources. If there were anything like a possibility that Chiang could reconquer China, this might make some kind of sense. But the "unleashing" was a purely political gesture, a way of breaking dramatically with Dean Acheson's policy of guaranteeing Formosa while minimizing the chances of a Red attack requiring American action. And the gesture ignored the perfectly natural eagerness of Chiang's government to involve the US in a war: unless the mainland is reconquered that government can look forward to nothing better than a reduction of its power and importance to a point proportionate with the size of the island it controls. But at the urging of those who believe we will have to fight Red China sooner



or later and had better do it sooner—Sen. William F. Knowland (R, Calif.), Rep. Walter H. Judd (R, Minn.), William Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia, and the whole of the China Lobby —the gesture was made, and ever since then Secretary of State Dulles has publicly encouraged Chiang to act in a manner which guarantees that eventually the Communists must try to knock-out his bases. Quemoy—120 miles closer to the mainland than Formosa, and in the very mouth of the port of Amoy—is home base for the mainland raids and for agents and saboteurs.

On September 3, Red Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy. The Nationalists immediately let it be known that they considered an invasion imminent. Nationalist planes began mounting strikes against the mainland. American correspondents were not allowed near the beaches, but in the US press it appeared that big things were happening. Only lately have we learned that the shelling was initially directed against landing ships bringing supplies to Quemoy and that nowhere within striking distance of the island was there anything like the number of boats the Red Chinese would have needed to attack. But Chiang kept shooting and the Reds kept shooting, and Dulles was asked a question: Does the US guarantee extend to Quemoy?

The answers which Dulles and, later, President Eisenhower gave to the question told us nothing except that they feared to provoke an attack by answering "no." In truth, we have no interest in Quemoy—and the three other, tiny, Nationalist-held islands near it—except that immense amounts of American equipment have gone into preparing its defenses. If the Red Chinese captured it, they would be only 3,000 yards closer to Formosa (120 miles away) so it is of no value in the defense of Formosa. Red artillery can sweep Quemoy from three sides, so it is useless as a jumping-off point for an invasion of the mainland. It is in effect indefensible unless the Seventh Fleet were ordered to shell and send planes against the China Coast.

Yet Chiang has concentrated such forces on Quemoy that to abandon it now as he has in the past abandoned, at US urging, many other such useless islands would strike at the prestige of Nationalist China in Asia. And continued vague pronouncements about whether the US considers the island important enough to fight over will equally involve US prestige. When the Red Chinese do move—as eventually they will—to take Quemoy, this nation may well find itself enmeshed in a net of Chiang's weaving from which it can only extricate itself at the expense of a considerable loss of "face." Many in Washington today readily admit that the only solution is a frank return to Acheson's policy of "neutralization." But that would require a great deal of political courage.

In the meantime, the US Military Advisory Group on Formosa is frustrated in its efforts to create a first-class defensive force by Chiang's insistence on organizing his army as an offensive force, hoping that in time his friends in the Senate and the House will over-ride the Advisory Group and see that he gets the offensive equipment he wants.

A firm, clear decision and declaration in Washington seems the only way we can gain that degree of control in Formosa necessary for a *calculated* risk.

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Paris Dispatch The London Conference

The success of the London Conference depends to a large extent on Washington. Though serious, the problems of working out a compromise between the proposals of Anthony Eden and those of Pierre Mendès-France that will be acceptable to Konrad Adenauer are not insuperable. But if the technical problem, both military and political, are to be approached with the best chance for successful solutions, certain obstacles have to be removed. These are in the first place ideological—in the extreme, religious sense of the word. The Eisenhower Administration has to recognize and accept the fact that the crusade for Europe has ended, and the work of building it, rationally and realistically, has begun.

A reconciliation between the crusaders in France, men like Georges Bidault, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Guy Mollet, and the realistic rationalists, above all Mendès-France, is almost certainly impossible. Yet, on the other hand, the crusaders elsewhere in Christian Little Europe, Adenauer and the militant Christian Democrats, Pierre-Henri Spaak and the zealots of Europeanism, now seem willing to compromise if the essentials of their cult are saved. They will also, almost certainly, accept whatever position Dulles takes at London.

There is also the personal factor. It is ultimately up to Dulles to decide whether the unmaking of Mendès-France is to remain a necessary prior condition of a German-American version of France-German reconciliation, and therefore of Western European integration. The Eisenhower Administration seems now to distrust the Frenchman even more than Adenauer does. The relative good-will he won from Dulles in their private meeting on the eve of the Geneva Conference was changed at the Brussels Conference into a personal antagonism greater than that of Secretary Cordell Hull toward General de Gaulle. This may serve a domestic US political purpose; in Western Europe it contrasts with the Frenchman's steadily growing popularity. While the delegates at Strasbourg treated him coldly, the people in the streets cheered him, as they had in Nevers and Paris. While party leaders in Paris made sour faces at his proposals, the whole press (except the Communist) gave them encouragement. A similar pattern of rejection from above and acceptance from below is reported from other Western European countries, even from Germany.



There is finally the factor of the New Deal. Mendès-France wants it not only in his own country but in the whole of Western Europe. His formula is a Europe free, prosperous and solvent. He will at the London Conference propose the application by all of the Brussels Treaty nations, and perhaps even by all the OEEC nations, of a number of conditions on social security and conditions of work drawn up in recent years by conferences of the United Nations International Labor Organization. He believes that the other Western European countries should bring their social security and wage systems up to a common level in order to liberalize trade and also to form effectively the proposed armaments community. This may be a bitter pill for the Republicans to swallow during an election campaign at home against the New Dealers; but for the making of Europe, it is good medicine.

The choice Dulles has to make in London is clear. Either he will consent to regard as essentially technical the problem of finding two compromises, first, between the Eden and Mendès-France proposals, then, between the resultant formula and the German-American position; and help in seeking a workable solution. Or he will take a calculated risk, based largely on what the Republican Party's high command may consider smart strategy for the election campaign. That is to try to make Mendès-France's third conference a failure for him and a success for his pro-EDC enemies, on the theory—or in the hope—that two setbacks in a row will cause the Premier's downfall in the Palais Bourbon and replace him by a man willing and able to revive the EDC plan and the crusade for its achievement.

According to the constitution of the Fourth French Republic, the defeat of three governments within a period of 18 months permits dissolution of parliament and new general elections. Two governments have already been beaten, and the period ends on November 20th. Thus, if Mendès-France loses in London, and then in Paris, there can be elections on the issue of EDC late this autumn, whereas otherwise they would not be held until 1956.

With French concessions, there is little in the Mendès-France plan that is totally inacceptable either to Britain or to Germany.

But Dulles can wreck the conference by demanding immediate entrance of West Germany into NATO and prompt granting of sovereignty, and Mendès-France can wreck it by putting the Brussels Treaty formula forward as the *present* solution and insisting upon postponing Bonn's entrance into NATO until after the formula has been fully tested.

Or, remembering that the French National Assembly in February, 1952, refused the admission to NATO of any country "with outstanding territorial claims," the French Premier might make the admission contingent on a final settlement of the Saar question and some sort of solemn declaration about "the lost Eastern territories" of Germany. He might argue that the present Assembly might otherwise refuse once again, while the National Assembly to be elected in 1956 would probably consent.

If Mendes-France insists on such delay, no matter what his arguments, he will find himself in a worse situation of isolation than at the Brussels Conference, for Eden too will be against him. The basic purpose of the conference, as the British and many Frenchmen as well see it, is to find a middle ground between the excessive demands of Dulles—responding to the pressures of Capitol Hill—and the excessive resistances of Mendès-France—responding to similar though opposite pressure in the Palais Bourbon.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

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The Odds Are Even in New York

by James A. Hagerty

A HARD and possibly close contest for Governor of New York at the election on November 2 was indicated as the Democrats nominated Averell Harriman, former Mutual Security Director, and the Republicans nominated Sen. Irving M. Ives. Mr. Harriman also has the nomination of the Liberal Party, estimated to bring him a minimum of 400,000 votes.

Both sides are expected to have plenty of money for a television and speaking campaign. The issues will run from legalization of bingo and greater state aid for New York City to the conduct of the Republican National Administration in handling national and international problems. As yet there is little indication of the probable outcome of the campaign. Its brief duration, little more than five weeks, may favor Senator Ives.

By naming Mr. Harriman and rejecting the candidacy of Rep. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., the Democrats at their convention in New York City failed in the opinion of many to nominate the stronger candidate. The convention was dominated by Carmine G. DeSapio, leader of Tammany and Democratic National Committeeman for New York State. There is no contention that Mr. Harriman, if elected, would not make as good a Governor as Mr. Roosevelt or perhaps an even better one. The complaint is that Mr. Harriman lacks color and that Mr. Roosevelt would have been able to make a more effective campaign as head of the ticket.

The Republicans in nominating Senator Ives at Syracuse undoubtedly named the best vote-getter available after Governor Dewey announced that he would not run for a fourth term. Mr. Ives, formerly majority leader of the State Assembly and well acquainted with the state's problems, was first elected to the US Senate in 1946, defeating former Governor Herbert H. Lehman, generally regarded as the strongest Democrat in the state. With Brooklyn Borough President John Cashmore, his Democratic opponent, lacking endorsement of the Liberal Party, Mr. Ives was re-elected to the Senate in 1952 by a record plurality of about 1,300,000. In carrying New York City by 2,500 in this election, he became the first statewide Republican candidate to carry the city in more than 30 years. After losing to Mr. Ives, Mr. Lehman was subsequently elected to the Senate, defeating John Foster Dulles, now Secretary of State, in 1949 for a short term and Joe R. Hanley, former Lieutenant Governor, for a full term in 1950.

In an attempt to allay the resentment of Mr. Roosevelt's upstate supporters, made evident at the session of the convention that nominated Mr. Harriman, the group of state organization leaders headed by Mr. DeSapio offered the nomination for Attorney General to Mr. Roosevelt. The latter, who had held out the olive branch by announcing his support of Mr. Harriman and moving that his nomination be made unanimous as soon as he had more than the 510 votes needed to nominate on a partial roll call, accepted the offer.

In filling out the slate, Mr. DeSapio in consultation with Mr. Harriman, Richard H. Balch, Democratic state chairman, and other leaders may have got into other difficulties by virtually ignoring upstate and organized labor in the selection of the other candidates.

AS A RESULT of these conferences, the Democratic convention nominated District Attorney George B. DeLuca of the Bronx for Lieutenant Governor and Aaron L. Jacoby, chief clerk of the Surrogates' Court of Kings County, for State Controller. The convention completed the ticket by naming Judge Albert Conway, Brooklyn Democrat, for Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and Judge Charles S. Desmond, Buffalo Democrat, for renomination for Associate Judge of the same court, and naming Judge John Van Voorhis, Monroe County Republican, now sitting by appointment of Governor Dewey, and Adrian P. Burke, Corporation Counsel of New York City, for the other two Associate Judges of the Court of Appeals.

Leaving out the judicial nominations, all three candidates for state administrative offices except Mr. Harriman are residents of New York City, and Mr. Harriman's actual residence is at 11 East Eighty-first Street, Manhattan, although he has always voted from the ancestral family home in Orange County.

Asked to explain this apparent ignoring of upstate

James A. Hagerty, one of America's most distinguished news correspondents, was for 34 years chief political reporter of the New York Times. *On Mr. Hagerty's retirement from the* Times *last July, the President of the United States wrote to him: "I envy you the experience you have had in your illustrious career. From now on, I sincerely hope you will enjoy your well-earned right to appraise critically the ration of news daily presented to the public, including all items bearing a White House dateline."*

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claims in making up the ticket, Mr. Balch recalled that when he first became state chairman he said that geography should be ignored in making nominations. He added that, "I said then that not where a man lives but what he is should be the test." Representatives of organized labor, who had hoped that Charles W. Halloran, past president of the Buffalo Federation of Labor, would receive the nomination for Lieutenant Governor, criticized the ticket and denounced Mr. DeSapio. Several said they intend to support Senator Ives.

Mr. DeSapio, more responsible for the nomination of Mr. Harriman and the selection of the rest of the ticket than anyone else, obtained his position of political dominance by the election last year of Robert F. Wagner as Mayor of New York City and his election as National Committeeman to succeed the late Edward J. Flynn, former Bronx leader, with whom Mr. DeSapio had been allied. This Tammany-Bronx alliance continues, with Rep. Charles A. Buckley succeeding Mr. Flynn as Bronx leader.

The election of Mr. DeSapio as a member of his party's National Committee enabled him with propriety to step into other counties. He brought about the election of Joseph R. Sharkey as Kings County leader in place of Kenneth F. Sutherland and caused the defeat of James A. Roe as Queens leader in the recent primary election. The result of Mr. DeSapio's increased prestige was shown in the division of the delegates to the state convention. Only 7 of the city's 512 delegates cast their votes for Mr. Roosevelt, though sentiment for his nomination is known to have been strong in a number of Assembly districts.

In deciding to back Mr. Harriman for the gubernatorial nomination Mr. DeSapio had the close co-operation of Mr. Balch. They had two reasons for their final decision. The first reason, which is debatable, was that Mr. Roosevelt would lose more Democratic votes and get fewer Republican votes than Mr. Harriman.

SUPPORTERS of Mr. Roosevelt, admitting probability of loss of a certain number of Democratic votes if he should be nominated for Governor, contended with apparent justification that there would be a much larger turnout of voters on election day if he were to head the Democratic state ticket. This increase in the number of voters, they asserted, would more than compensate for any such loss. This argument failed to impress Mr. DeSapio who continued to line up delegates for Mr. Harriman.

The second and probably more important reason was belief that the party organization would get along better with Mr. Harriman than with Mr. Roosevelt, particularly in distribution of patronage, if a Democratic Governor is to be elected. Mr. DeSapio must have recalled that Mr. Roosevelt was first elected to the House of Representatives as an independent with the support of the Liberal Party, running against the regular Democrat.

This doubt of Mr. Roosevelt's "regularity" was strengthened when he asked for and received the support of Daniel P. O'Connell, powerful Albany County leader, and William B. Mahoney, Erie County leader. Both Mr. O'Connell and Mr. Mahoney are opposed to the leadership of Mr. DeSapio and Mr. Balch.

Mr. DeSapio's activity and success at the Democratic convention not only places on him responsibility for Mr. Harriman's election but opens the way for Senator Ives and the Republicans to make Tammany a leading issue of their campaign. The Republicans are certain to try to capitalize the traditional upstate Democratic resentment against Tammany domination of their party in their campaign. This resentment had great part in Mr. Roosevelt's success in getting upstate delegates. It may not have all been dissipated by his nomination for Attorney General.

BOTH Democrats and Republicans expect to win the state election. The Democrats believe there is a general Democratic trend throughout the country which will be reflected in the result in New York State. Mr. Harriman and his running mates are expected to attack the Dewey Administration for failing to take steps to check unemployment, for legislating a 15-percent rent increase and for refusing to give adequate state aid to New York City and other municipalities. The harness race track scandal also is expected to bring the Democratic candidates many votes.

Legalization of bingo was expected by the Democrats to become a major issue. Senator Ives has met this by insisting on a Republican platform plank for a constitutional amendment to permit local option on bingo conducted by religious and charitable organizations.

The Republicans will defend the administration of Governor Dewey, and call for state development of Niagara power and expansion of the anti-discrimination laws, of which Mr. Ives was a sponsor.

Mr. Harriman, whose past experience in public office has been in the national and international fields, is expected to continue his criticism of the Eisenhower Administration.

The Democratic nominee for Governor, originally a Republican, joined his present party in 1928 because of his admiration for the late Alfred E. Smith. Sixty-two years old, Mr. Harriman is a graduate of Groton and Yale and inherited $40 million from his father, E. H. Harriman, railroad magnate. Brown Brothers and Harriman is his private bank.

Mr. Harriman served in important posts under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman as Ambassador to both Russia and Great Britain, Secretary of Commerce and chairman of the committee which laid the basis for the Marshall Plan.

Senator Ives has a record as a liberal Republican. He is credited with strength in organized labor and in the past has had support from independents in politics.

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THE '54 CAMPAIGN

Twenty years of political reporting provided the background for CBS commentator Griffing Bancroft's coverage of the primaries this year. Here he takes a general look at pre-election voting trends.

Two Parties in Search of an Issue

by Griffing Bancroft

THE DEMOCRATS should win the Congressional elections this Fall; history says so, opinion polls say so, and the record of voting to date says so. But these elections should be close, and no landslide can be anticipated: the lack of any overriding national issues and personal observation say that.

The Maine election, of course, was the greatest fillip the Democrats have had. It wasn't so much the defeat of an apparently unpopular Governor, as it was the overall drop of some 12 percent in the Republican vote for winning GOP Congressional candidates. That drop may be explained away as partly due to a carryover to the rest of the ticket from the adverse vote for Governor. Some of it may be explained away as partly due to local, rather than national, issues. But it cannot all be explained away.

In truth, most Republicans don't attempt to minimize these Maine elections. Instead they take the tack of Vice President Nixon who with a smile, albeit somewhat wry, purports to welcome the Maine results as something which may wake up his party to the realization of the close fight ahead and so make the stalwarts work harder. And as a curious converse, many Democrats instead of hailing Maine as an unmixed blessing are fearful it may lull their stalwarts into complacency. But for the average voter only a small piece of paper and the stub of a pencil suffices to show that even if just a fraction of that 12 percent GOP drop in Maine carries over into other states, it will be enough to give Democrats control of the House.

As for the rest of the voting to date, it is not only unwise, it is virtually impossible, to try to draw conclusions from primary elections. They are intra-party and usually local, except in the one-party South where they are final, and if there are any national trends that is where they must be reflected. And a definite trend has been established in these Southern primaries: a trend away from the holdover Dixiecrats, the pro-Eisenhower Democrats and the conservatives, toward the so-called loyal Democrats and the liberals.

This trend started last May in North Carolina where the liberal former Governor Kerr Scott unseated Sen. Alton Lennon who was backed by the conservatives. Later, in Alabama, Adlai Stevenson's running mate, Sen. John Sparkman easily out-distanced four opponents including Rep. Laurie Battle who was aided by the pocketbooks of diehard Dixiecrats. And in Tennessee Sen. Estes Kefauver, with strong labor backing, administered a two-to-one defeat to conservative Congressman Pat Sutton.

Of course, in many Southern states, the issue of conservative versus liberal never got as far as the actual balloting, and there were two notable Southerners who escaped the trend: Sen. John McClellan of Arkansas and Governor Allan Shivers of Texas. McClellan defeated the New Deal-former Arkansas Governor Sid McMath, but most observers believe this was due almost entirely to the televised Army-McCarthy hearings which came conveniently just before the Arkansas voting. Faced with a McClellan in this new, and highly publicized role of the defender against McCarthyism, McMath went about the state pointing out that McClellan never attacked McCarthy when McCarthy attacked Democrats, that he only started when McCarthy started attacking Republicans. McMath's counter-attack wasn't good enough and he got licked, but it is worth noting that in the same state and the same elections, the conservative Governor Francis Cherry, without benefit of a television forum against McCarthy, was beaten by a political unknown, Orval Faubus, a weekly newspaper publisher.

The other Southern refugee from the trend was Shivers, but the trend was there just the same. In 1952 Shivers romped over the liberal Ralph Yarborough; this year Yarborough forced him into a very close run-off primary. All of this gives every evidence that the South is returning to the loyal Democratic fold.

OPINION POLLS consistently show Democrats gaining. Many say that is just the historical gain normally registered by the party out of power. But the historical trend this year has more history back of it than usual.

The reason the party out of power usually gains in off-year elections is clear enough. The party in power

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got in by electing a President. The President must have been popular or he wouldn't have been elected, and his popularity naturally pulled in some of his Senatorial and Congressional running mates in otherwise close races. But two years later the party in power must run without benefit of the President's name on the ticket.

But history, with all due respect, is sometimes a dangerous guide to the present. It has its contradictions. In 1948 Harry Truman was elected President, but Truman pulled in few Congressional candidates. In most states and districts almost the opposite was true, for Democratic candidates for the House and Senate mostly ran well ahead of the Presidential candidate; to some extent at least, they pulled him in. Yet in the next off-year elections, 1950, the party out of power, the Republicans, played the historic role and gained five Senate and 30 House seats. This could not have been the sloughing off of coat-tail riders, since few had ridden the Truman coat-tails. It was rather the result of a big national issue.

THE converse of 1948 took place in 1952. Then General Eisenhower, without question, pulled in many Congressional candidates. In almost all states and districts, the Presidential candidate ran well ahead of his fellow Republicans. Both these instances, 1948 and 1952, seem to bear out the polls—that the Democrats are the majority party in the United States and will be beaten only by a big adverse issue, or when some popular hero is put before the voters by the Republicans.

The one instance in modern times when the party in power gained in an off-year election was in 1934. Franklin Roosevelt had been elected for the first time in 1932 and was taking steps to combat the depression. This beginning of the New Deal was popular, and FDR was popular. With his name not on the ticket, in 1934 Democrats-in-power, instead of slipping, gained nine Senate and nine House seats. Politically, that may have been Franklin Roosevelt's greatest achievement; and the question that will be settled in November is, can Ike do in 52 what FDR did in 34. If he doesn't it means Democratic gains, but it doesn't at all mean a Democratic landslide. Travel around most parts of this country and you find people at least reasonably contented and happy. There are without question distressed areas; but the country over all is prosperous.

Some are not as prosperous as they have been, of course; others are not as prosperous as they would like to be. But, by and large, it is difficult to find any real voter discontent, any restlessness, any overwhelming desire for a change.

Similarly, Democratic attempts to exploit foreign policy blunders don't seem to get far. After all, the Korean War has been settled; there is peace in Indo-China; if things look bad in Europe, at least there is no fighting. And if all this does lay the groundwork for further Communist expansion, people don't seem inclined to worry too much about it now. Anyway, foreign policy is seldom a big issue in off-year elections.

Efforts by the Democrats to get the political ball rolling on other issues—unfair tax cuts, giveaways, favoritism to business and so forth—also seem stuck. Perhaps some people who shouldn't are profiting from these things, but the average voter hasn't been hurt by them—yet.

In the last two off-year elections, 1946 and 1950, national issues were overriding. In 1946, while the war had ended, controls were still on, taxes were still high and, if you remember, there was a critical meat shortage just before elections. Republicans capitalized on this and won control of the 80th Congress. Out of power again after the 1948 elections, Republicans came back with gains—as we have mentioned—in 1950. In that off-year election, the Korean War had just started, controls were being put on, there was panic buying and resulting synthetic shortages. Another natural issue for the party out of power, and the GOP made the most of it.

Unfortunately for the party out of power this year, the Democrats, no such sure-fire issues have come along. They are groping. But if the Democrats have no real issue, neither have the Republicans. After 20 years of attacking the White House, they suddenly find they can't do it any longer. The old tried and true, much used, Communists-in-government issue seems at last worn out. Responsible Republicans scarcely mention it any longer, except occasionally in passing—and in the past tense. Waste, inefficiency, corruption are no longer good GOP watchwords. Even creeping socialism and government hand-outs don't get far, since most of these things Republicans have been wailing about for so long are now part of the Republican program.

THERE IS still, of course, a small but loud remnant of the Old Guard that continues this line of attack. But they find themselves mostly attacking their own party, and if this fragment helps anyone, it helps the Democrats. So, by and large, Republicans are in the throes of trying to rewrite their past campaign speeches. Their answer to all Democratic charges are simply good Republican fingers pointing to prosperity indices on the economic charts, and good Republican bragging about what a great man President Eisenhower is—and how he heads the team of which they are loyal members.

In short, the campaign on the national level seems largely to be two parties in search of an issue with real voter appeal. Without a compelling issue on either side, everything favors the Democrats by a safe but small historical margin. Without a national issue, most of the elections are likely to be decided largely on purely local, state or district matters, and on the personal prosperity of the opposing candidates. For now the Republicans are on their own; long and broad as Mr. Eisenhower's coat-tails have proved, they hardly can be stretched all the way from 1952.

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West Germany's Secret Service

The Mysterious Herr Gehlen

by Joachim Joesten

ON JULY 20, Dr. Otto John, former West German secret service chief, fled to the East Zone of Germany. He took with him vital information on the operation of Western intelligence operations in the Communist Zone.

Clearly it was a matter of time before the Soviet authorities arrested and shot the many men whom John betrayed. On September 23, in fact, the Soviet Government made its actions known. In a letter to Dr. James B. Conant, US High Commissioner in Bonn, the Soviet High Commissioner, Georgi Pushkin, announced the arrest of 400 Western undercover agents in the Communist Zone. Pushkin charged that the 400, and another 100 men who had voluntarily surrendered were the employees of West Berlin and West German organizations that in turn were branches of United States espionage and sabotage agencies.

Pushkin named several organizations known to have carried on an underground political struggle in the Eastern Zone with US support. But most of the 500, he declared, were members of the West German intelligence organization headed by General Reinhard. Gehlen.

Little was known of Gehlen until John fled. Now it is generally agreed that it was Gehlen's rise that led John to join the Communists. Reports in both the American and German press that Gehlen has received substantial financial and material subsidies from United States intelligence agencies have neither been affirmed nor denied by the US government.

GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN, who is now about 55 years old, is the lone survivor of a famous (or infamous) galaxy of German intelligence aces active during the last war. Of his former fellow-players in the "great game," about one half (in particular Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and General Hans Oster) were hanged by order of Hitler, while the other half (Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Kaltenbrunner) met a similar fate at the hands of the Allies, or committed suicide.

A professional soldier since he first was able to carry a rifle, General Reinhard Gehlen by and large has managed to steer clear of any political involvement. He was a Nazi, but not a particularly conspicuous or rabid one. He served Hitler faithfully to the bitter end—this loyalty kept him from plotting with Canaris and Oster, who were executed after the July 20, 1944, blowup—but did not stick his neck out needlessly. Thus there was no hue and cry for him after the collapse of Nazi Germany. Most importantly, however, Gehlen, when the war ended, had something valuable to offer, and he promptly found takers.

Even the best-informed sources profess to know little more about Reinhard Gehlen than the skeletonized facts of his military career, which closely followed the traditional German pattern. Fresh out of school, Gehlen served in the last phase of World War I. After the 1918 armistice, the young soldier, like so many of his fellow-veterans, found it hard to return to the humdrum routine of civilian life. He enlisted in the "Black Reichswehr," and, after that body had become official and respectable, he was commissioned an artillery lieutenant in 1923.

At the outbreak of World War II Gehlen had the rank of colonel in the General Staff. A typical desk officer, he was satisfied to work hard in obscurity. Clear-headed and diligent, he gained a reputation as a master of organization, but he has never been noted for any bravery in the field. For only a brief period, in the Spring of 1942, was he assigned to the command of an artillery regiment. Before the year was out, he was back at his desk in the War Ministry, in charge of *Fremde Heere Ost"* (literally, "Foreign Armies, East"), the military intelligence division concerned with the Eastern front.

In this capacity, Gehlen directed all military intelligence and counter-espionage activities in the German-occupied Eastern territories, the Soviet Union and the satellite states. He worked, by and large, independently of the *Abwehr,* the famous secret service headed by Admiral Canaris. He was, however, under the close supervision of Reinhard Heydrich's (after January, 1943, Ernst Kaltenbrunner's) *Reichssicherheitshauptamt,* or Reich Security Office, operated by the Gestapo. Hence,

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Joachim Joesten, the author of four books on international events and a contributor to Foreign Affairs, Barron's *and the* Antioch Review, *has recently returned from Germany.*

All statements of fact contained in this article have been made public in one or another of the leading German newspapers; none are secret or confidential.

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Dr. John

Gen. Gehlen

a large number of Gehlen's staff was—and still is—trained and indoctrinated by the dreaded Nazi political police.

From that period also dates the only picture of Gehlen that has ever been published. It shows him sitting in the front row of a bemedaled and beribboned group of high Nazi officers. One of the highest decorations bestowed by Hitler for wartime service shines proudly on Gehlen's uniform tunic. That he did a good job as head of the Nazis' Eastern front intelligence is also apparent from his subsequent promotions. For in 1944, Gehlen became a major-general and in the very last months of the war he was promoted to lieutenant-general.

When the shooting was all but over, General Gehlen hastily packed up his priceless archives and his lists of underground agents and moved, across the quickly narrowing gap of still unoccupied German territory, from the Eastern to the Western front, where he surrendered to the Americans.

The Counter Intelligence Corps, after assessing the value of its catch, promptly released General Gehlen from custody. Better still, it told him to get right back on the job and carry on. At the time, the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany was swarming with the pick of Red Army divisions and the West was fearful of an impending assault by them. It appeared imperative, therefore, to try to obtain as much information as possible about the Red Army's strength, its dispositions and troop movements, its armament and so forth in Eastern Germany. Instead of sending American agents into the territory held by the not-so-friendly ally, the CIC decided to make the fullest possible use of the spy network which General Gehlen had built up in the East. Moreover, it was assumed that Germans would better be able to report on conditions in Eastern Germany, and that it would be easier to handle them through fellow-countrymen, that is, Gehlen and his staff, than through foreign agents.

Gehlen jumped at the offer, and by early 1946 he was back in business at the old stand, minus the Nazi uniform, and under new management. His early reports were well received and before long he was able to expand his operations. He set up his headquarters in the idyllic little village of Pullach, some seven miles south of Munich, in the Isar Valley.

(In 1951, when I was in Bavaria with my family, we found it impossible to obtain hotel accommodations in Munich. So we drove out to Pullach, put up at a hotel there and parked our little French car outside, on the square. In the morning, we found that somebody, in the dark of night, had cut all four tires on our car with a knife. We took this as a hint that we were not welcome in town and moved on. It was only several years later that I learned for the first time that Pullach had been taken over almost entirely by the Gehlen organization and that strangers were no longer welcome in this once-popular tourist resort.)

Ever since, the *Gehlen-Apparat,* as the Germans call it, has been expanding by leaps and bounds. It has long since ceased to be concerned merely with what is happening in Eastern Germany. "In recent years," a German newspaper (*Welt am Sonntag,* Hamburg) wrote a few months ago, "Reinhard Gehlen has built up an information network that reaches clear to the Ural Mountains (*i.e.* to the limits of European Russia), and which is so closely meshed that no movement of troops within this area passes unnoticed."

Concordant reports in the German press have put General Gehlen's present staff at about 4,000 persons and his annual operating funds at around $6.2 million, of which $3.5 million is reported to come from American sources.

THE "Apparat" consists of a *political division* with a staff of about 3,000 and a *military division* of about 1,000. It has at its disposal every facility known to a world-wide intelligence agency, from small-time informers to underground broadcasting stations; from secret research laboratories to espionage schools and scientific evaluation centers, where a highly trained staff of scholars and technicians sifts and digests printed material published in all the world's languages. Of late, signs of increased activity by the Gehlen organization have been reported from such widely scattered parts as Hong Kong, Stockholm and Madrid. The French, in particular, have been aroused by information indicating that Gehlen agents are at work in that country.

General Gehlen has received many pats on the back, both from his American sponsors and from the Bonn Government, for the uncanny accuracy and precision of his intelligence reports. But the German public are not so happy over his alleged intrusion into the domain of internal security, which under the law is reserved to the Office for the Defense of the Constitution.

As a tell-tale sidelight on these apprehensions, it may be mentioned that German telephone users, when they hear a suspicious noise on the wire, taunt the supposed secret listener with the remark *"Grüssen Sie Gustav"* (Give my regards to Gustav), a sly reference to the Gehlen outfit which is commonly believed to engage in wire-tapping, even in Western Germany. Why "Gustav"? For a long time, the personality of General

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Gehlen was so shrouded in impenetrable secrecy that even his first name was unknown. So somebody called him "Gustav" and the name stuck, becoming a nickname after the general's real first name had become a matter of public record.

Until about a year ago, the Gehlen organization had a "safety record" of which it was justly proud. Few of his agents in Eastern Germany had fallen into the hands of the Communist Security Police, and most of its secrets remained well-hidden. Then, at the end of October, 1953, it suffered a serious set-back, which led to the arrest of scores of Gehlen men behind the Iron Curtain. The story of how this came about will undoubtedly go down, in the annals of the Cold War, as one of the most bizarre episodes in secret service.

TO READERS of the German equivalent of dime-novels, Hans Joachim Geyer, better known by his pen name of Henry Troll, had been for some 20 years a steady source of assorted vicarious thrills. Out of Geyer's nimble brain, detective stories, adventure tales and gory mysteries tumbled at a mass-production rate, eagerly snapped up by the lending libraries. Geyer-Troll started out on his literary career in the early years of the Nazi regime. In due course he amassed a tidy little fortune. He bought an expensive property in the fashionable Berlin suburb of Falkensee, where he lived with his wife and three children until 1945. After the war, Falkensee became a part of the Soviet zone and the Communist regime expropriated the prosperous thriller-writer, who had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1928. The Geyers had to give up their swanky villa for some pretty shabby quarters. But the prolific Troll did not allow this misfortune to cramp his style for long. Before long, he was turning them out again, as of old. Only he decided there was more money in writing for a West German publisher than for the nationalized firms of Eastern Germany.

Exactly what prompted Geyer-Troll, in 1952, to exchange his profitable business of manufacturing cloak-and-dagger yarns for a personal stake in the real thing is not clear. He had plenty of money, but perhaps he wanted still more. Or, maybe he felt the conscientious author's urge to experience first-hand what he so often wrote about. In any event, Geyer enlisted as a "Forscher" ("explorer") with the Gehlen organization.

One of the biggest and most active branches of the *Gehlen-Apparat,* at the time, was "9592," Berlin. This key outfit, headed by one Arndt Polster, alias Alfred Paulberg, enrolled H. J. Geyer, who was now given the *nom de guerre* of "Grell." "Grell" performed to the complete satisfaction of his superiors until the famous uprising of June 17, 1953. Then, with the Soviet spy hunters breathing down his neck, he precipitously left his home at Falkensee, taking refuge in the Western sectors of Berlin. Since he had proved himself reliable in the past, Geyer was accepted in West Berlin without further screening. He was switched to the "home service" and was put in charge of the filing department at Branch 9592. His job was to stand guard, nights, over the wooden closet in which all personnel records were kept. (Purchase of a steel safe had been put off by headquarters, for economy reasons.)

In making this appointment, Geyer's boss, Polster, commited a first-rate blunder. For he overlooked one of the key rules in any intelligence outfit: never to employ in a sensitive position any person whose family is within reach of the adversary. And Frau Geyer, with her three children, was still living at Falkensee, under the thumb of the Communist police.

Whether Geyer yielded to threats against his family, or he had been a Soviet agent in disguise all along, he soon betrayed the trust that had been put in him. With the aid of a micro-camera, he photographed the files he was supposed to guard. (The closet was kept locked at night, but Geyer easily gained access to the files by means of a skeleton key.)

The climax came in almost ludicrous fashion.

In mid-October, 1953, the chief of Branch 9592 was looking for a new secretary. He instructed Geyer to run advertisements in the local papers and to screen applicants. For this purpose, Geyer posed as the representative of a large West German industrial concern. Since he could not very well ask the job-seekers to come to the office, nor to his private apartment, he arranged to meet them in a restaurant. One of the girls misunderstood. She thought Geyer was more interested in her charms than in her secretarial abilities. Being interviewed in a restaurant also struck her as a suspicious approach.

So the girl went to the police and told them this fellow surely must be trying to recruit prospects for the white slave traffic. It didn't sound too implausible, for there have been many such cases in Berlin lately.

A German newspaper says (left): "He doesn't want to be recognized." A Swiss newspaper (right) says Gehlen "is a man without a face, for the public. Not even the greatest German press photographers could get a picture of the secret man."

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On October 29, at 10 a.m. two detectives from the West Berlin vice squad rang Geyer's apartment bell. He had not come home from his night shift yet, and the landlady truthfully told the police officers she had no idea where her tenant worked.

About an hour after the detectives had left, Geyer came home. The landlady told him what had happened, only she had no idea which section of the criminal police the two gentlemen had come from. Geyer, panic-stricken, took it for granted that counter-espionage was on his trail, having got wind of his nightly, extracurricular activities at Branch 9592. He slapped his load of films into a bag, jumped out of a back window into the garden below and made his way to the Soviet sector.

Within a matter of hours, the big crackdown on Gehlen men in Eastern Germany was under way. By nightfall, more than 300 persons had been rounded up, including key agents in East zone ministries, newspapers, the police, etc. The following day, the Communist press gleefully reported, with plenty of photos and facsimiles for evidence, that the biggest "American spy ring" yet had been smashed.

NOT LONG after this débâcle, on December 11, 1953, General Gehlen for the first time appeared before the EDC Committee of the Bonn Parliament, to brief the deputies on his plans and activities. After his talk, committee members declared themselves "deeply impressed" by what they had heard. Most impressed of them all was a ranking member of Chancellor Adenauer's own party, Herr Karl Franz Schmidt-Wittmack. On August 21, 1954, Schmidt-Wittmack, recipient of top-secret information about the Gehlen organization, bolted to the Reds, following the example set, one month earlier, by Dr. Otto John.

The case of Dr. John has been so fully reported in the press there is no need to dwell on it here. It represents the most portentous defeat yet suffered by the Bonn Government, and the democratic West, in the Cold War. And this veritable catastrophe was largely of General Gehlen's own making.

For several weeks, the Bonn Government attempted to obscure the real reasons for John's defection. It talked glibly of abduction, baited traps, will-destroying drugs and what not. In the end, it had to be admitted that John had gone over to the East of his own free will. But what knowledgeable Germans believe was his dominant motive for doing so is still being twisted.

Dr. John fled to the Communist camp, they say, because he was the loser in a dramatic tug-of-war between his own secret service, the Office for the Defense of the Constitution, and the more powerful *Gehlen-Apparat*.

The intense rivalry between Otto John and General Reinhard Gehlen has been general knowledge in informed German circles for a long time. It became more acute as the day approached when Germany was to regain her sovereignty. General Gehlen, realizing that he could not very well continue to operate on American funds after West Germany had become a sovereign state —in the event of a change of regime he might be labeled a paid foreign agent—had been pressing the Bonn Government for some time to take over his "Apparat."

Among many other people, Dr. John opposed the plan, since it inevitably meant a merger of his own service with that of General Gehlen. And he had no illusions as to who would come out on top as head of the combined services. Even in the past, Chancellor Adenauer had favored Gehlen to the extent of submitting to him, for a counter-check, intelligence reports received from Dr. John's office. And General Gehlen had access to the Chancellor night and day, whereas Dr. John, in his four years as internal security chief, was received only twice by Adenauer for a few minutes' talk.

A detailed plan for the merger of the two secret services immediately after S- (for Sovereignty) Day, had been worked out by the Chancellor's closest aide, State Secretary Dr. Hans Globke. This former Nazi official, a long-time personal friend of General Gehlen's—from the days of the Hitler regime—never has made any bones about his dislike of Dr. John, the one-time emigrant, and his boundless admiration for General Gehlen.

When John continued to balk, and even counter-attacked Gehlen by supplying journalists with anti-Gehlen material, it was decided to eliminate him.

One week before July 20, 1954—the date on which Dr. John crossed over to East Berlin—State Secretary Globke placed on the desk of Chancellor Adenauer a voluminous personal file marked "Otto John." This dossier, compiled in years of painstaking research by the Gehlen organization, described in ample detail all of Dr. John's shortcomings, which were many. Besides accusing him of traitorous dealings with the British Secret Service during the last war, the dossier charged secret intelligence with the East. The clincher, however, was a compilation of sordid rumors about Dr. John's private life. He was charged with just about every sexual perversion in the book, among other failings.

Adenauer, after studying the report, is said to have told Globke in disgust: "I never want to see that man again." Dr. John took this literally and vanished.

WHEN he eliminated his top rival from the political scene, General Gehlen undoubtedly scored a personal victory. But all indications are that it was a Pyrrhic one. For Dr. John, too, had compiled a dossier about his rival; that he is making the dossier available to his Communist hosts is indicated by the recent mass arrests in East Germany. Left is a secret service chief who has become the talk of the country, a hush-hush organization that is being discussed everywhere in public places, and agents who cannot until too late know if their names were on John's list.

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Delhi Dispatch One Section of Asian Opinion

Americans, by and large, are perhaps annoyed when Indian Prime Minister Nehru describes US diplomacy in the East as "doubletalk" and "doublethink." But to many Asians the Manila Treaty signed at the eight-nation conference on Southeast Asian defense is evidence for the charge. Seldom has so much been staked by so many for so little. Not a desire to bring together the principal non-Communist nations of Asia but rather the idea that since many Asian countries rejected a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization it should be launched immediately without adequate Asian representation, seems to have driven Washington policy-makers. Of the five Colombo Powers, the mainstay of non-Communist Asia, only Pakistan came to Manila; and that something more than anti-Communism brought the Pakistan Foreign Minister there became clear when he opposed singling out Communist aggression in the treaty, preferring a definition which by implication would embroil the US in any Indian-Pakistan conflict.

How—despite the US-appended "understanding" that it is really Communist aggression that is being prepared for—does the average Indian react to the Manila Treaty? As an Indian leader, sensitive to the Communist threat, put it, this latest example of American diplomacy in Asia makes it more difficult than ever for Asians to reconcile their desire for national independence with opposition to Communism.

He cited as an example, Thailand, the only other Asian nation represented at Manila, which has undergone a number of "palace revolutions" and army *coups* in recent years. There may well be new *coups* and further political instability, which, although welcomed by the Communists, could not technically be ascribed to Communist activity. But Thailand ruling circles affected by such shake-ups would find the Communist bogey very useful and, if the recent East Pakistan experience is an indication, they would have little difficulty convincing American policy-makers that invocation of Article 4 (2) of the Manila Treaty (consultation for joint action when peace is threatened) might be appropriate.

Many here who wish America well feel that the US needs to be saved from its Asian partners. Already the choice as co-crusaders against Communism of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. Syngman Rhee has harmed American prestige in Asia. The question asked by Asians now is: What has SEATO to defend except the special interests of some of the signatories to the treaty?

Burma has all along striven for some kind of Asian *entente* to block Communism. Nehru has so far prevented it, but circumstances would have sooner or later forced him into line. Now, with an American-sponsored SEATO in the field, even Burma will think twice before pushing the idea again, for any such move is likely to be identified, at least by the Communists, with American-inspired efforts. And nothing deprives anti-Communist efforts here of effectiveness and popular support as does the stigma of US instigation.

Dr. Sastroamidjojo (right)

On the other hand, some kind of alliance involving India, Burma and Indonesia, with China as invisible partner, is now almost certain. Even Nehru, hitherto a staunch opponent of such link-ups lest they should look like *blocs,* seems convinced now that such a grouping is necessary to counterpoise SEATO and preserve the balance of power in Asia. The forthcoming visit of the Indonesian Premier, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, to Rangoon and New Delhi is expected to pave the way for such an alliance, which earlier, when Burma worked for it, would have been entirely different from the anti-SEATO league now foreseen.

It may be argued that the SEATO powers are alive to this aspect of the question and have, therefore, pledged themselves to end colonialism in Asia. But unfortunately Western anti-colonialism does not impress the average Asian, primarily because of the instruments it uses, Viet-Nam provides a typical example. Before the cease-fire agreement was reached at Geneva, America pressed France to accede to Viet-Namese demands for self-government. But the retention of France's puppet-Emperor Bao Dai fostered the idea that French abdication was being sought not primarily because of American opposition to colonialism, but so that America could wage its anti-Communist war with better results. America's anti-colonial claims will not carry greater weight until she exercises greater care in the choice of friends and partners. In many Asian countries, unpopular regimes perpetuate obsolete social and economic systems with the help of dollars and US-supplied armaments.

American military experts never lost an opportunity to advise President Roosevelt that in the interests of winning the war against Japan in 1942, he should urge Britain to grant the political demands of India. Today there has been an exchange of positions between Britain and America, and in approaching Asian nationalism the US can now profitably take a tip from Britain. Current British attitude toward China in general and Formosa in particular has the advantage of taking Asian opinion with it, without at the same time leading to appeasement of the Communists.

Dropping Chiang Kai-shek and his discredited counterparts would not weaken the US position in Asia, but actually strengthen it. Similarly, a more realistic attitude toward Chinese membership in the UN would undercut a good deal of Communist propaganda. Without these preliminaries, SEATO will be ineffective. Given such a reorientation of US policy, the present SEATO may still be superfluous but its purpose will be better served.

New Delhi G. S. BHARGAVA

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BOOKS & COMMENT

What Writers Are and Why

by Malcolm Cowley

THE question has been argued for a long time, and some of the recent answers haven't been flattering to writers as a group. For many officials of the present administration, the average writer—always excepting James Burnham—seems to be defined as a possible or probable security risk. For some of the newer critics, he is a mere purveyor of raw material, or texts, which the critics explicate without much attention to what the writer intended them to mean. For psychoanalysts he is a patient, or prospective patient. One analyst, Dr. Edmund Bergler, has described all writers as victims of "the writer's neurosis," which the doctor explains as a type of oral regression. Would he also describe carpenters as manually regressed victims of the carpenter's neurosis?

There is something one-sided in these current attitudes to the writing profession and I would like to suggest another approach. For me a writer is a man or woman who writes. Simple and tautological as the definition seems to be, it ends by having implications in several fields—vocational, social, functional, and psychological—that it might be useful to explore.

In vocational terms, the writer is a person for whom writing is the central activity—though it isn't always the activity that takes most of his time. Until each of them was in his sixties, T. S. Eliot probably devoted more time to being a banker, an editor, and a publisher, Wallace Stevens more time to being an insurance executive, and William Carlos Williams more to being a physician with a general practice, but writing was central with all of them. Of course all three are poets and that—in our present society—explains the division of time. Prose writers earn more by writing; hence they can—and should—make it their profession as well as their central interest.

In social terms, the writer is a person with *readers*. His consciousness of having readers, now or in the future, and thus of leading the most important part of his life in public, helps to determine his social character. He must assume a role, or a whole series of roles. When he talks to himself he wants his words to be overheard; note that writers' private notebooks are almost always written to be read. He wants to communicate; even the most abstract and difficult poets have some clear message for the reader, if the message is only: "See how difficult my poems can be!"

ALL WRITERS are nourished by the sense of having an audience—or in exceptional cases, like that of William Blake—by faith that the audience will someday be found. If they lose that feeling it is as if they had been deprived of some essential food; often they suffer from psychosomatic complaints that sometimes prove fatal and almost always they stop writing. There is the familiar example of the German novelists under Hitler. Some of them wrote books that could be published because they flattered or at least didn't offend the ruling powers. Others weren't allowed to publish anything, but their exiled colleagues said, "Wait till Hitler is overthrown and we'll find that they've all written novels and put them away in their desk drawers." When Hitler was overthrown, all the desk drawers proved to be empty.

In functional terms, the writer is a craftsman whose medium is the written language; he works with words as a painter works with shapes and colors, a composer with tones, and a cabinetmaker with wood, glass, and metal. Like every good craftsman he wants to make objects, or artifacts, that will have an independent existence and will play a part in the lives of people he has never seen. Like every good craftsman he has reasons for believing in the high importance of his own medium; and the writer, so it seems to me, has the best reasons of all.

Language is the specifically human gift and the cohesive force that holds each nation and tribe together. One might call it a fifth dimension of human life, for the human community exists in language almost as it does in space and time. From another point of view it is our greatest co-operative undertaking, with millions of persons each year inventing new words or turns of speech, most of which will soon be forgotten.

One of the functions of writers is to choose among these innumerable possibilities, fashion a literary medium, and invent new expressions of their own, which in turn may be used by millions of others.

Writers have other functions too; notably they tell stories that become the myths of the tribe, as well as presenting characters that can serve as tribal heroes and villains. At this point, however, I should like to emphasize their linguistic function, because it is being overlooked by so many theorists. Dr. Bergler, to mention one example, has written a whole book about writers (*The Writer and Psychoanalysis*) without stopping to think that their words are intended to have a meaning for readers. Words for Dr. Bergler are simply "milk" that the writer produces out of himself as a substitute for mother's milk; their value is purely subjective. The doctor has forgotten the most important feature of this "milk." It must be transformed into products with an objective value for others, or else it will be refused and eventually the writer will stop producing it.

THE WORDS of great writers may set the linguistic pattern of whole nations. Dante—not alone, but vastly more than others—set the pattern that would be followed in Italy. T. S. Eliot said of him that he has "a place in Italian literature which in this respect only Shakespeare has in ours. They gave body to the soul of the language, conforming themselves to what they deemed its possibilities." If Dante had been born in Venice or Rome or Palmero instead of Tuscany, modern Italian would have been a different language—and one might add that modern Italians, who think mostly in words, like people

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everywhere, would have had slightly different thoughts.

What happened in France is a more complicated story, but once again writers played a central part in it. Sixteenth-century French was a rich and disorderly language whose spirit was close to that of Elizabethan English—though it had no Shakespeare to give it a lasting body. Classical French, as written and spoken a hundred years later, was a new medium fashioned for the needs of polite society, which was also new at the time. Among those who worked to create the new medium were some opinionated poets, led by Malherbe, all the members of the new French Academy, and many fashionable ladies who invited men of letters to their salons, where ladies and guests argued politely about the words that could or couldn't be used in polite literature.

ONE RESULT of their discussions and refinements was that classical French became an extremely supple language with a limited vocabulary, easily learned by foreigners, in which every word had a definite meaning. It was and deserved to be the second language of cultivated people in all the other European countries. Essentially it was a prose language, but Racine proved that it could also be a medium for poetry so flawless and moving that it not only survived as part of the living theatre but also preserved a whole group of social and literary conventions. In the 1920s I used to attend performances of *Phèdre* in the French provinces. I came to feel that Racine, besides writing the play, had also formed the actors and had, in some measure, created and trained the audience.

These are great names that I have mentioned, but the same sort of work is being done on a smaller scale by authors of our own time and country. One of their achievements in the last fifty years has been the creation of a rich and flexible prose style based on Midwestern rather than New England speech. As a literary medium, the Midwestern style derives from Mark Twain, who is still the master of American prose, but it also owes a great deal to Gertrude Stein and Sherwood Anderson. Perhaps it owes more to Hemingway, whose novels made it so popular that for a time it promised to become the accepted vehicle of American fiction. Soon the Midwestern style was affecting the popular speech from which it had developed, so that a whole generation of young Americans learned to talk like Hemingway's heroes.

Writers are always changing the language in this fashion. As craftsmen in words, bent on improving their medium and giving it force and purity, they earn a respect from others that often they don't deserve as individuals. W. H. Auden, in his elegy for Yeats—originally published in this magazine—expressed what I am trying to say in three short stanzas:

> Time that is intolerant
> Of the brave and innocent,
> And indifferent in a week
> To a beautiful physique,
>
> Worships language and forgives
> Everyone by whom it lives;
> Pardons cowardice, conceit,
> Lays its honors at their feet.
>
> Time that with this strange excuse
> Pardoned Kipling and his views,
> And will pardon Paul Claudel,
> Pardons him for writing well.

In psychological terms, the writer is a person who keeps trying to find the exact and meaningful words for any situation, because he believes that such words have a magic power. It is this word-mindedness that distinguishes writers from scholars, who deal with various orders of facts, and from intellectuals or speculative thinkers, who deal primarily with ideas.

Many writers are also scholars or also speculative thinkers: for example, Thomas Huxley was all three. But facts retain their value whether or not they are expressed in words that cast a spell; often they are best conveyed in pictures or graphs or columns of figures. Many ideas are capable of being expressed in mathematical symbols, and at other times they can be badly expressed, in the wrong words—as John Dewey often expressed them—without losing their value. Dewey wasn't a writer properly speaking, and neither was his great precursor, C. S. Peirce. William James and Santayana were writers, but that hasn't any bearing on the question whether they were greater thinkers than Dewey or Peirce.

For the writer properly speaking, language is not only the medium in which he works but also the medium in which he lives and breathes. His private universe consists of words, and no experience seems quite real for him until the revealing and magical words have been found for it. Sometimes he regards himself as a soldier fighting against the unknown and the unexpressed; he is like a Roman legionary always serving on the frontier. Sometimes he is an explorer trying to broaden that civilized homeland which is the area of consciousness by finding the proper words for new experiences. "In developing the language, enriching the meaning of words and showing how much words can do," T. S. Eliot said in his talk on Dante, the poet "is making possible a much greater range of emotion and perception for other men because he gives them the speech in which more can be expressed."

This attempt to describe the writer as a species, brief as it has been, suggests one or two disturbing questions about the effect of our present educational system on the future of American literature. For the last 20 or 30 years our high schools have been devoting less attention to what educators have taken to calling "word skills"—that is, to vocabularly, spelling, grammar, pronunciation, and writing themes. They have also devoted somewhat less attention to literature and great deal less to foreign languages. The result is that many students are entering college with no feeling for their own language, no taste for reading, and with what used to be called a twelve-year-old vocabulary.

THE COLLEGES are doing their best to teach the subjects that the schools neglected—including elementary or "remedial" reading—but they are starting at a late stage in the student's career. Recently a professor of physics complained that many young men were entering college with so little knowledge of mathematics that the handicap couldn't ever be overcome and that, no matter how brilliant they were, they could never hope to be scientists. One question that disturbs me is whether something of the same order mightn't be true in the literary field. Isn't it possible that many potentially brilliant writers learn so little about the language at an early age that they will never be able to use it properly, to say nothing of enriching it? And isn't it possible that the lack of reading skill in the general public will also affect the future of American literature, by restricting its audience?

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Nature of Diplomacy

THE FIVE lectures by Charles Burton Marshall at Hollins College, now happily published, should be compulsory reading for many Americans who persuade themselves, if no others that they are better qualified to deal with international relations than men trained to the task in the foreign service. Even some Senators and Congressmen may find here some new ideas on the properties and limitations of their calling.

For years Mr. Marshall was the consultant of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives and later he was a member of the Policy Planning Committee of the State Department. He is therefore eminently qualified to write with some authority. With a careful reading of this concise and illuminating volume, those Americans suffering from an acute attack of self-righteousness may be able to get their feet upon the ground and face the ominous realities of these dangerous days.

The Limits of Foreign Policy by Charles Burton Marshall (Holt; $3).

Because we are a rich and powerful nation, the man in the street—and some members of Congress—cannot understand why other nations do not follow us in every detail; why we do not pound the table or crack the whip when they fail; why we do not reach our ultimate goal with a dramatic charge instead of advancing, with reasonable patience and understanding, step by step. He concedes that our Government must conform to public opinion and follow the processes of democracy but he thinks it sheer insolence for other nations to follow the same line. He knows that our domestic politics has an effect on our foreign policy—and sometimes a bad effect—but he cannot agree that the same must be true in England, France and Italy.

The author points out the difference between military planning and diplomatic planning. While he does not say so, he gives the impression that it may be a mistake to assign so many professional soldiers and big business men to the delicate task of diplomatic negotiations. Neither is trained for the job and only in the rarest cases are they temperamentally qualified. Both are impatient of delay and scorn the idea of patience, of advancing step by step, of reasonable concessions and compromises without which negotiations between nations are almost sure to fail. Diplomacy is a game of give and take. When one party bluntly lays down the law it is an invitation to its violation. We are told by the author that "responsibility enjoins upon us the qualities of magnanimity, urbanity, and patience in proportions greater than has been our habit." We may not care what Russia does, but it would be stupid to be indifferent to what our allies think. He warns that whenever we take an arbitrary stand obnoxious to our allies we betray ourselves to the enemy, and whenever we resort to threats we are "undoing the principles of free government." In short, our policy, to succeed, must depend not on dictation but on consent.

In these days when men high in public station exhaust the vocabulary of abuse on England, France or Italy because they have not been able to see eye to eye with us on every point, these observations of the author cannot be too deeply impressed. "Far from applauding," he says, "we should learn to spurn those who in office, or in quest of it, truckle to an assumed public appetite for easy promises and grand assurances about world affairs."

He implies that many are deceived even by their hindsight, so often wrong. Citing some examples of the criticism of arm chair experts, he recalls a criticism of the State Department for not foreseeing the conflict between metropolitan France and the natives in North Africa, and when the critic was told it had been foreseen, he triumphantly demanded why the State Department had not prevented it! And a more popular criticism that we "lost" China when we never had it to lose. These critics do not seem to know that the millions in China would not supinely do our bidding and ignore the Chinese problems peculiar to themselves; or that there was a lack of zeal in the army and tragic blunders by the Chinese Government we could not control. General George Marshall, great both as warrior and statesman, made an unsuccessful effort to "save" China, but the diplomat of the street corner and the mass meeting would have had no trouble.

Another complaint of the critics is that had we landed in the Balkans instead of in France the Russians would not have had possession of the Balkan States now. It should interest these critics to learn that the idea was considered by greatest strategists in the army, and rejected for very good military reasons. The military experts so acted because "the terrain there is forbiddingly difficult for amphibious operations"; because of "distances from bases to points of attack and the lack of port facilities for supplies" would have made it dangerous; because the "land configurations gave every benefit to the defense"—in brief, because it was militarily impractical if not altogether impossible.

Especially interesting is Marshall's idea of the weaknesses of the United Nations. He doubts "the projection of differences into open debate," since it "involves a real danger of making the position of the disputants inflexible." In support of this idea he quotes Arthur Balfour:

> How is the task of a peace maker to be pursued if you are to shout your grievances from the house tops? The only result is that you imbitter public feeling, that the differences between the two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought never to have been allowed to approach, that the newspapers of the two countries agitate themselves, that the parliaments of the two countries have their passions set on fire, and great crises arise which may end, and have sometimes ended, in international catastrophes.

This evokes memories of Lodge and Vishinsky hurling verbal brick bats and accomplishing nothing. We are reminded that "to commit publicly the prestige of one's government sometimes makes it awfully hard to back down even a little bit." Then, too, Mr. Marshall thinks that to invite the whole world to take sides on every local issue makes mountains out of mole hills, and "intensifies world differences without doing anything whatever to help the parties immediately concerned on toward a solution." Again, due to radio and television, he finds statesmen tending to histrionics on an exaggerated scale to elicit public applause. "One of the drawbacks of microphone diplomacy in the conduct of international affairs," he says, "is large gatherings under full publicity . . . the theatrical attitude in world relations which tempts vain men

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and governments to try for grandeur by big talk."

Here, then, is a book much needed, written with clarity, penetration and wisdom. Here we are told that diplomacy at critical stages is something for the closet and not a mass meeting; that patience, understanding and urbanity are indispensable tools of a diplomat; and in this most critical moment in modern history we can well dispense with the irresponsible shouting and complaining of the head-line seekers who have been doing serious harm and creating doubts beyond our border of both the judgment and unity of the United States. CLAUDE G. BOWERS

Trygve Lie's Report

THE PRICE OF POWER is responsibility, and Trygve Lie must be held responsible to a great extent for what the UN is or is not today. The haste with which he has brought his recollections to print,

In the Cause of Peace, by Trygve Lie (Macmillan; $4).

barely a year and a half after leaving his office on the thirty-eighth floor of the Secretariat Building in New York, seems to indicate that he feels compelled to explain and to justify.

In the closing pages of his book, Trygve Lie emphasizes that peace without freedom is meaningless: "Anyone can enjoy peace if he is willing to accept his neighbor's conditions," he writes, but "what he obtains in the end will probably fail to conform with the views and desires of all peace and freedom-loving people." Trygve Lie's record as Secretary-General of the UN, and to a certain extent his book, show that often he was concerned with peace at practically any price.

Thus, as early as 1946, Mr. Lie was aware of the threat to Czechoslovakia. Jan Masaryk, the then Czechoslovak foreign minister, in whose sincere devotion to peace and freedom the author never doubts, gave him all the hints that were necessary. In 1948, barely a month before the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Masaryk reiterated his warning to his friend Trygve Lie. Czechoslovakia fell and Masaryk died. Mr. Lie doubts that he committed suicide. The then representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations, Jan Papanek, broke with the Prague regime and brought the tragic events that were then unfolding in his country to the attention of the Security Council. His appeal was endorsed by Hernan Santa Cruz from Chile. It had the support of Sir Alexander Cadogan of Great Britain, of Warren Austin of the United States, of Alexander Parodi of France. Trygve Lie kept silent. It would have been a great service to historians, as well as to the defenders of peace and freedom, if Trygve Lie had told us why he kept silent at that time.

Despite what had happened in Czechoslovakia, despite the Communist-led civil war in Greece, despite the Russian threat to Turkey, despite the pressure applied by the Soviet Union on Yugoslavia, Trygve Lie was, until June, 1950, the proponent of the soft line toward the Soviet Union. When in March, 1946, Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, called a spade a spade and coined the expression "iron curtain" Trygve Lie disagreed. He was on the side, he says, "of those liberals who believed that Churchill had flung down his challenge to Soviet Russia at a time when most people hoped for the success of peace-time collaboration with the USSR."

In 1949 the Secretary-General of the United Nations used his high office to attempt to convince the US Delegation not to support the Yugoslav candidacy. For Tito, who had broken with Stalin a year and a half before, this election to the Security Council was vital. Many diplomats believed then and still believe, that if Yugoslavia had not been seated in the Council and thus had found itself isolated from the West as well as from the East, Stalin would have struck. Trygve Lie bowed to the threats of Andrei Vishinsky—threats which in his book—he qualifies as rather vague.

In 1936, Stalin had had occasion to test Trygve Lie's resistance to pressure. The then Norwegian Minister of Justice barely hesitated when the Kremlin demanded the expulsion from Norway of Leon Trotsky. The demands were accompanied by implications (maybe less vague than Vishinsky's in 1949) that Russo-Norwegian trade relations might suffer considerably if Trotsky was not thrown out.

Mr. Lie claims that he had to expel Trotsky from Norway "for betrayal of conditions of asylum there." It is a fact that the future Secretary-General of the UN noticed this "betrayal" of Leon Trotsky a few hours after the verdict of the first Moscow trial was announced. But Mr. Lie says that although he was obliged to expel Trotsky, it was he, after all, who as Minister of Justice, had admitted the "hunted and sick revolutionary when he asked for asylum."

Mr. Lie says that he still wonders why in 1946 the Russians agreed to his nomination as Secretary-General. I was a consistent opponent of Communism, he says in substance. So were the other candidates to the post, particularly Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium and Lester Pearson of Canada. Stalin could not expect the Spaaks and the Pearsons to bow before his threats. Lie became his choice, the ideal compromise.

The 448 pages of *In the Cause of Peace* are not a complete record of Trygve Lie's stewardship of the UN Secretariat. The author regrets that it was impossible for him to take up such questions as Kashmir, Indonesia and the Italian colonies. It is noteworthy that the Czechoslovak debate in the Security Council does not even rate a mention.

Quite naturally, Mr. Lie puts great emphasis on his "peace mission" as he calls his 1950 trip to Washington, London, Paris and Moscow and Prague.

The reception accorded to his "twenty-year peace plan through the United Nations," based primarily on a procedural provision of the Charter about the convening of periodic meetings of the Security Council, was far from enthusiastic. Hard-headed socialist Ernest Bevin was blunt. Lie's suggestions, he said, in substance, can wait. What is needed is evidence that the Russians are "willing to accept and bow to the rules." They must not be allowed, Bevin said, to go on using pressure as they had until now and continue their walkouts and boycotts of the UN (the USSR was then boycotting the UN organs in view of their refusal to oust the Chinese Nationalists).

Bevin's attitude "disturbed" the Secretary-General. And, although he expressed the belief (in an interview with Prime Minister Clement Attlee) that "the people must be given no illusions," he suggested that Attlee issue a "non-committal communique" on the Lie-Bevin discussions stating that "no door

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was closed in London for genuine negotions."

Mr. Lie is particularly proud of the popular support his "peace mission" had provoked. In his book he quotes the encouraging remarks of the London bobby guarding 10 Downing Street and of the elevator man in his London Hotel. This reviewer also remembers the reception organized by the staff committee of the UN Secretariat to hail "our chief" when he returned from his trip. There were flowers and rehearsed spontaneous applause. All sorts of women for peace and similar outgrowths of the Stockholm appeal were at hand to add to the greetings.

"Europe wants peace" the Secretary-General informed his subordinates in a tear-choked voice. "My reception in Moscow was encouraging," he reported to a jammed press conference.

A few weeks later South Korea was invaded. Mr. Lie discovered (he says now) that "Moscow in its public show of warmly welcoming my peace mission a month before, had been building up a peaceful atmosphere well-suited to the surprise attack in Korea."

Mr. Lie had learned. From the day he denounced before the Security Council the North Korea aggression Mr. Lie ceased to be, for Moscow, a Picasso dove.

The American reader of Mr. Lie's book will be particularly interested in his chapter about "the Communist issue in the Secretariat," although this chapter contains relatively little new material. No one, and certainly not this reviewer, will dispute the fact that Trygve Lie's position was far from enviable. All that can be said is that Mr. Lie's decision in regard to Secretariat staff members suspected of Communist activities was not sustained by the Administrative Tribunal of the UN.

The merit of Mr. Lie's book is to point up some of the problems the UN was able to solve. Thus the chapter concerning Palestine is interesting, quite complete and contains a few sidelights which were not known to the public at large. It was not known that at one point in the Palestine debate, Mr. Lie had decided to resign in protest over the handling of the case in particular by the United States Government and that he suggested that Warren Austin, Chief delegate of the US, resign at the same time. This offer, Mr. Austin rejected. Apparently he did not consider Mr. Lie's suggestion important enough to be reported to the State Department.

PETER J. ALLEN

Nasal Congestion Associated With Head Colds May Cause Symptoms Of

SINUS

Thousands have received amazing, fast relief with this sensation, new treatment, from symptoms of hay fever, asthma, sinus headaches, pressure in forehead, soreness in eyes, cheek bones, top of head, back of head and down neck, when caused by nasal congestion. Write for 7 DAY FREE TRIAL, POSTPAID, no cost or obligation to try it except; it is agreed you will mail it back, postpaid at end of trial period if not amazed with results..

National Laboratories, Dept. S37A, Galt, Calif. Offer not good in California.

Economic Thought

WISE ECONOMISTS appreciate that economic doctrines develop and adjust to the times. There may be periods of doctrinal stagnation under a stifling orthodoxy and years of rapid growth or revolutionary change such as occurred in the 1930s with the publication of J. M. Keynes' *General Theory*. Such shifts or changes, if plotted on graph paper, might resemble business activity charts.

Economic Doctrine and Method, by Joseph Schumpeter, translated by R. Aris (Oxford; $7).

However, the long-term growth of the body of economic theory is evident if one takes a broad view, covering decades and even centuries.

Early in his career Joseph Schumpeter took such a view of his chosen discipline. At the age of 30, he wrote this mature "historical sketch" of economic doctrines and economic method. Published in German in 1914, it has now been translated into English.

With the publication of this book, Professor Schumpeter established his reputation as a well-rounded economist and sociologist. The basic ideas and characteristics of his later works were present in this survey and two other books, *The Theory of Economic Development* and a volume on the content and essence of theoretical economics—all written before his 30th birthday.

For a broad survey of economic thought from the Greeks to modern times, Schumpeter was eminently qualified. Intimately acquainted with the writings of English, American, French, and Italian as well as German and Austrian economists, he brought to his task a remarkable breadth of view and an ability to appreciate the essential contribution of a great variety of writers. In the tradition of Germanic scholarship, Schumpeter is historical, analytical, and thorough yet selective. And, unlike so many theorists of his time, he was conscious of the evolutionary nature of doctrinal development and of the dangers of narrow analysis resting on one or a few simple relationships.

Professor Schumpeter used to tell his students at Harvard that as a youth he had three ambitions: to be the world's greatest economist, the world's greatest lover, and the world's greatest horseman, but that he never could learn to ride horses well. Typically, Schumpeter preferred to perform in the grand manner and often with a flair for showmanship.

A school of disciples never developed around Schumpeter. His genuine followers are few in number. He rejected the use of simple "models" and schematic answers that often are convincing to uncritical minds. Schumpeter's breadth of knowledge made him conscious of the limitations of economic theorizing on a narrow base, and his stress on dynamic development caused him to reject the static economic analysis of his time.

Such wisdom and perception did not, however, prevent Joseph Schumpeter from making positive theoretical contributions and from offering profound insights into the workings of the capitalistic system. He sought to work out a theory of capitalistic development on the scale of Marxian analysis but free of the errors and slogans that characterized Karl Marx's thought. That he fell somewhat short of his goal is an indication more of the height of his aim than of any lack of ability.

In his later years, Schumpeter suffered from having made his intellectual commitments early in his career. Unlike J. M. Keynes, he did not continue to grow by revising mistaken earlier views and reworking his mental contracts. In taking a hostile position toward Keynesian economics and other recent theoretical advances, he tended to isolate himself from the main stream of current economic thought.

Schumpeter's greatness lay in an extraordinary ability to view economic analysis in its broadest terms. While

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other theorists played around with the technical aspects of economics, he emphasized the problem of economic growth, until recent years a badly neglected subject. With a few exceptions, including a mistaken initial for Irving Fisher, this translation has been skillfully performed. In 200 pages it offers to English readers a panoramic treatment of economic thought unavailable in any other history of similar size.

RICHARD A. LESTER

Successful Partnership

WHATEVER may be the ideological pull of state's rights, the fact is that nearly all states are run with "stone age tools,"

Adventures in Politics, by Richard L. Neuberger (Oxford University Press; $3.50).

by part-time officials who are paid such a pittance that they must supplement their incomes elsewhere. The "elsewhere" is commonly and conveniently provided by special interests that want special favors from government. Against this well-documented background we see why the lumbermen, cattlemen, truckers and race track owners have more zealous champions than Mr. John Q. Public, who may lose his national heritage, those resources which the federal government has conserved since the days of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot. The multi-billion dollar oil give-away was only the first triumph of this "administrative" change which includes dozens of legislative proposals concerning our public lands, forests, minerals and power.

This is a first-rate handbook on state government, but it is fascinating as are few textbooks. In part this is because the author is an able journalist, but chiefly because he is a political participant. He shows us flesh-and-blood men sweating and grappling over state problems and sometimes over basic principles of justice and freedom. He, himself, is a young man and member of the minority party in Republican Oregon. His own career was outstanding long before the Neubergers decided to run simultaneously for office. When he stepped up to the state Senate, his wife took his place in the House of Representatives. She has done well, also, and largely because she has dared represent the housewives who elected her, as when she demonstrated the messy chore of coloring margarine, and thereby won the repeal of an old law in a dairy state.

On the surface the Neuberger story has elements of the American husband and wife idyl, and seems almost tailored for political soap opera. For instance, when the opposition publicized the lady candidate's photograph in a bathing suit, the strategy backfired because she, a former gym teacher, is extremely well put together. But basically there is nothing stereotype about this couple, whose sheer character and ability account for their success.

The book should encourage these groups whom the author wants to multiply in government; namely, younger men, career public servants and qualified women. On this point he is especially winsome, since he admits his shock when his wife first proposed running for office. After he had conquered his repugnance, as only a well-integrated male can, he found that "no deed has ever returned such rich and heart-warming dividends" as her filing for office. For the majority sex to hold only one-half of one percent of all elective and appointive offices is not only a waste of woman's resources, but an impoverishment of government.

On one point the author may have had a change of heart. He stresses the tragic and constant "sluicing off of able people from state government," but following the usual pattern, he is running this fall for the United States Senate. However, he would make no usual Senator, for his story suggests the gallant, resourceful and liberal leadership which he would bring to Washington.

EMILY TAFT DOUGLAS

MALCOLM COWLEY's article is part of his next book, *The Literary Situation*. Noted historian and former Ambassador to Spain and Chile, CLAUDE G. BOWERS' latest book is *My Mission to Spain*. PETER ALLEN worked for several years as a newspaper correspondent covering the United Nations. RICHARD LESTER is Professor of Economics at Princeton University. Herself a former member of Congress, EMILY TAFT DOUGLAS is the wife of Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois.

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THEATRE

THE SEASON has opened with a couple of plays which neither arouse profound admiration nor incite a critic to that scornful, if witty, dismissal which is the usual alternative. I don't mean they are boring, either. My state of mind during the greater part of both evenings wavered, rather, between mild discomfort and acute distress. Some of the malaise may have derived from my heartfelt agreement with both authors on one central idea: that family life is the most successful instrument of self-torture yet devised by an ingenious and masochistic species, an exquisite compound of tedium, irritation, comic misunderstanding and tragic suffering. If I were of a grateful disposition, I should doubtless tell them how truthful they are and how I enjoy agreeing with them. As things are, I am going to retort that, though life may consist in an attempt not to get stuck in the mud, I do not think the aim of art should be to go back to the bog and wallow in it.

The petty reporting of naturalism has got to be transformed and transcended either by a large realism or by poetic fantasy. *Home is the Hero* by Walter Macken and *All Summer Long* by Robert Anderson stay stubbornly in the smaller world, untransformed, and one might almost say: unformed.

I could be wrong about the stubbornness. Possibly an attempt is made by both playwrights to get beyond genre painting and the notation of psychological traits to the great and complex moral conflicts which are the proper subject matter of drama. For one thing, if they are not to send us home in the first intermission they have to take the curse off the family catastrophe by indicating an alternative. Our age of infantile paganism will in general find this alternative in children and animals, and Mr. Anderson (though not Mr. Macken) is in this respect a man of the age. Both authors resort to one of the crudest features of melodrama. You can take the curse off the family catastrophe, paradoxically enough, by running a steam roller over some younger member of the family's foot. An instructive treatise could be written on The Juvenile Cripple as Tear-Jerker: from Charles Dickens to Charles Chaplin.

The voice of righteousness, for Messrs. Macken and Anderson, speaks through the lips of the juvenile cripple who has no evil in him at all. (I should like to write a play in which a cripple *is* evil; only Shakespeare thought of it first; naturally, *Richard III* is considered highly unrealistic these days.)

Except in giving a picture of a hideous family, and indicating a virtuous alternative only through a crippled boy. Messrs. Macken and Anderson are completely different. Mr. Anderson fails through staying in the groove of current American dramaturgic cliché, Mr. Macken through never getting into it. *All Summer Long* is another mood play, belonging to the succession that began with *Summer and Smoke* and *Member of the Wedding*. The aim is Chekhov's trigger effect: the releasing of larger forces by tiny movements. The actual fact is a series of tiny movements each ticketed, in at least one speech, with the author's intentions and even views. All sorts of motives and motifs hover about the play without quite getting into it. Or, if they do get in, it is in the form either of clumsy symbolism or overt mention. Under the former head, I would place the main incident of the action: the house in which our family lives is being undermined by the river and will collapse. Under the head of overt mention, I would place many of the cripple's speeches, especially one in which he lists and sums up the other characters and another in which he states the theme of Conrad's *Shadow Line*.

The general effect is not of large forces and tiny movements but of big intentions bogging down in small facts. The strivings after poetry and mood (especially by the director, the designer, and the orchestra) accentuate, rather than mitigate, the laborious factuality of Mr. Anderson's naturalistic method. Then, too, as in *Tea and Sympathy*, this author tends to substitute clinical information explaining people for dramatic action presenting them. I should like to add that the mother in the new play seems to me an exception; here at last Mr. Anderson seems to be responding directly to someone and not trying to put things he has heard in capsule form. He also has a nice sense of humor that would save the occasion if the occasion could be saved.

When I say that Mr. Macken fails through avoiding cliché, I mean that he is so austerly indifferent to present Broadway mores that he could surmount the obstacle he places in his own path only by writing an undeniably great play. Providing neither cliché nor greatness, *Home is the Hero* can scarcely impose on the Broadway audience the virtues it does possess, such as thoughtfulness and virility. (The robust humor does register). Mr. Macken tells the story of a bully who returns from five years for manslaughter with his joy and confidence gone but still a bully. Joshua Logan could have made a hit out of the show by making the bully an object of pity and "audience indentification," for American stage bullies, current vintage, have the hearts of children. So far from emulating Mr. Logan, Mr. Macken acts the part of his own protagonist mercilessly. His shrewdness, even in the choice of a theme, has not equalled his sincerity. Does a bully, if he is only a bully, make a good protagonist for a drama? It seems to me doubtful.

Home is the Hero seemed very badly directed (by Worthington Miner). At least it would be hard for a mere spectator to place anywhere else the blame for bad blocking and timing and a forcing of the pace as by an amateur imitator of Kazan. (For while Kazan builds the rising action of a sequence carefully from a low point up, Mr. Miner would suddenly try to make a scene jump from nothing to the highest pitch of excitement.)

All Summer Long was, as it were, much better bred. The standard of production was higher throughout. The child actors seemed, as they usually do, better than the adults. (Which proves . . . ?) There was good directing, somewhat imitative of Kazan, by Alan Schneider, and good designing, highly imitative of Mielziner, by Mielziner. One performance, however, was disturbing: John Kerr's. When I praised Mr. Kerr in two earlier plays, I thought I was praising acting. I now wonder if I wasn't really praising a certain sort of personality—perhaps only a certain sort of sex appeal emanating from a pouting, indolent, insolent face and a helpless, dead voice. In the next role he undertakes, let Mr. Kerr prove me wrong.

ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Eisenhower and the Liberals

In 1952, before the Democratic candidate for President had been chosen, you published a letter from Alvin Johnson which offered a rationalization for liberal support for Eisenhower. I would be interested to know if, in the light of the performance of the Eisenhower Administration, Mr. Johnson is satisfied with his judgment of two years ago, and also if he is sympathetic with the Eisenhower plea for the election of Republicans on the basis of their party alone.

ROBERTA S. BLANK

Philadelphia, Pa.

. . . Dr. Johnson Explains

If Mrs. Blank's first question were simply, am I satisfied with the Eisenhower Administration my answer would be brief. I am profoundly discontented with it. My answer to the second question can be brief. Eisenhower's plea for the election of Republicans of whatever color is to my mind a major error.

But the first question asks whether I am satisfied with my judgment of two years ago. I could answer that question briefly, if it were merely my individual judgment. But it was also the judgment of the 10 million Democrats who elected Eisenhower. Our judgment should be approved or condemned, not in the light of what Eisenhower has become, but in the light of the circumstances of the time.

My first premise was that one Republican or another would be elected. The Democrats had achieved marvels in their 20 years in office. They were still doing a good job. But America loves alternation in political parties. The popular feeling, "Time for a change," presaged a Republican victory. Which Republican, Eisenhower or Taft?

Taft was the abler man. But his following was the Cave of Adullam group of isolationists and advocates of a preventive war. Under Taft one could expect government by a combination of reactionary Republicans and reactionary Democrats. Under Eisenhower we expected a government by a combination of progressive Republicans and progressive Democrats. These appeared to be the true party alignments, not nominal Republicanism and Democratism.

What reason had we for thinking that Eisenhower would lead a progressive Republican and Democratic coalition? In the first place he had never been a party man. In the second place, he owed everything he had or would ever get to three Democrats: Roosevelt, Truman and General George Marshall. No Republican President or Chief of Staff would have selected an unknown like Eisenhower to lead the American army in the World War. MacArthur would have been their obvious choice.

I was under no illusions as to Eisenhower's domestic policy. Having the equipment of an adolescent in economics and politics, he would be influenced, or rather controlled, by his associates. I took it for granted that he would play with the big industrialists and bankers. A general does not play with privates, either in the army or in civil life. But I thought that our domestic economy had been so firmly nailed down by the Democrats that a Republican Administration could do no great harm. They could not return to Hoover *laissez faire* on speculation, depression and unemployment. They could not abolish social security. They could not throw the farmer to the wolves. They could make only minor anti-reforms in taxation. They could not make the tariff much worse than it was.

I had not foreseen the penchant for giving away the national assets. But if I had, I would still have been for Eisenhower as against the far shrewder Taft. We are a rich nation and can stand a considerable amount of looting.

What I considered crucial was the matter of foreign affairs. The Democrats had achieved notable success in blocking Communism in Greece, Turkey and Korea. The isolationists might howl against the Democratic containment policy, but Eisenhower would realize its value. He could not question the value of the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Charter, Aid to our Allies, Point Four.

Under the Democratic Administration we had, in Acheson, the ablest statesman since John Hay. But Acheson was reduced to impotence in world affairs by the incessant screaming, baying, braying, of the Republicans in Congress. No foreign government could have any confidence in the word of a statesman who would probably be repudiated at the next election.

I assumed that General Eisenhower, with his immense personal prestige would be able to curb the bloodthirsty civilians in the Republican Party. Down to the present all he has managed to achieve is a slight reprimand to McCarthy—not for mixing in foreign affairs but for pricking the skin of the Army. The Knowlands and such talk freely to the world over the heads of Dulles and Eisenhower.

Truman is right: the only thing that can save Eisenhower is a Democratic victory in the coming election. Such a victory may shock the young virginal conceptions of economics and politics out of Eisenhower's head. It may make him realize that his only chance for a consistent and rational foreign policy lies in forming a coalition of progressive Republicans and progressive Democrats. Fortunately in their long period of control the Democrats acquired some sense of statecraft and parliamentary decency. Eisenhower could work with them, if he could sweep party delusions out of his mind.

Do I expect such an Eisenhower regeneration? Alas, no. Most likely we are in for another two years of footless and vacillating foreign policy. If so, the country will not take the risk of keeping in power a party that has proved so strikingly its utter unfitness to govern.

ALVIN JOHNSON

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WHERE TO RETIRE TODAY —AND ENJOY IT

by Norman D. Ford

If there is anything I have found out in traveling up and down this country and throughout the rest of the world, it is this: It costs less to retire than you may think it does—*provided you know how to discover those places where it costs less to live the kind of life you like.*

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(In the next column, read about two books by Norman D. Ford which tell you just this.)

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